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DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA CAPE TOWN GABORONE PRETORIA MBABANE

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QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAPUTO 0218

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PBOR PFOR EAID MZ US RH

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE FOREIGN MINISTER

JOAQUIM CHISSAN AND CHARGE

REF: MAPUTO 215

1. SUMMARY: IN DISCUSSION THAT LASTED JUST OVER HALF AN HOUR, MOZAMBIQUE FOREIGN MINISTER JOAQUIM CHISSANO INFORMED CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON RHODESIA WAS TAKEN AFTER LONG DELIBERATIONS, SAID HE EXPECTED US TO CONTRIBUTE "MEANINGFULLY AND SIGNIFICANTLY" TO ANY UNITED NATIONS AID PROGRAM DESIGNED TO HELP MOZAMBIQUE OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH IMPOSING SANCTIONS, DENIED PROSPECTS OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT
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IN RHODESIA AND HOPED THAT US WOULD CONDEMN SOUTHERN RHODESIAN

AGGRESSION IN HIS COUNTRY. CHISSANO ALSO CRITICIZED US PRESENCE AT DIEGO GARCIA AND URGED USG TO PUT MORE PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA TO PULL OUT OF NAMIBIA. END SUMMARY

2. CHARGE RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL AT HIS RESIDENCE MORNING OF MARCH 5 AND WAS INFORMED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM AT FOREIGN MINISTRY AT EIGHT-THIRTY AM SAME DAY AFTER ARRIVING AND WAITING NEARLY QUARTER OF AN HOUR AT MINISTRY, CHARGE WAS SHOWN INTO FOREIGN MINISTER'S OFFICE. CHISSANO EXPLAINED THAT PRESIDENT MACHEL HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO CALL IN ALL CHIEFS OF MISSIONS OF "FRIENDLY WESTERN STATES" TO DISCUSS MOZAMBIQUE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF RHODESIAN SANCTIONS AND TO TALK ABOUT SEVERAL RELATED MATTERS. FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC TOPICS CHISSANO RAISED:

A. MOZAMBIQUE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS: CHISSANO SAID THAT PRESIDENT MACHEL'S DESIRE TO SEE BLACK MAJORITY RULE ACHIEVED IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA WAS GENUINE, AND THAT HIS SPEECH OF MARCH 3 WAS NOT A BIG "PROPAGANDA" SHOW. THE DECISION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS HAD BEEN REACHED AFTER LONG DELIBERATIONS AND AFTER ASSESSING A NUMBER OF FACTORS. SANCTIONS WERE APPLIED ONLY WHEN GPRM FELT THEY WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AND MEANINGFUL. CHISSANO CITED THE UNIFICATION OF ANY FIGHTING FORCES. WEAKNESS OF RHODESIAN ECONOMY, AND FUTILITY AND HOPELESSNESS OF CONTINUED NKOMO-SMITH NEGOTIATIONS THE FACTORS THAT MOST INFLUENCED HIS GOVERNMENT'S DECISION. STATE OF THE MOZAMBIKAN ECONOMY WAS NOT A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR, HE SAID, SINCE IT IS IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION FROM CAPITALIST TO SOCIALIST AND ONLY EXPLOITERS ARE LIKELY TO BE SERIOUSLY AND IRREVERSIBLY HURT BY GOVERNMENT DECISION. CHISSANO POINTED OUT THAT BRITISH AND NUMBER OF UNNAMED AFRICAN STATES HAD "PRESSURIZED" GPRM TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS RIGHT AFTER INDEPENDENCE. GPRM REFUSED AND CONTINUED TO REFUSE TO IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS UNTIL NOW, WHEN THE CHANCE OF THEIR BEING TOTALLY SUCCESSFUL WAS GREATEST.

B. US ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE: NOW THAT SANCTIONS HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED, CHISSANO SAID MOZAMBIQUE WOULD NEED SOME ASSISTANCE TO ALLEVIATE ITS LOSSES. COMMONWEALTH NATIONS AND AFRICAN AND SOCIALIST STATES WERE NOW OFFERING HELP. HOWEVER, HE DECLARED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT "ANY GROUP OR COLLECTION OF

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STATES TO MONOPOLIZE" ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE USG COULDHLP MOEAMBIQUE BY CONTRIBUTING "MEANINGFULLY AND SIGNIFICANTLY" TO ANY UNITED NATIONS AID PROGRAM ESTABLISHED TO KEEP HIS COUNTRY FROM SUFFERING TOO GREATLY. WHILE NOT RULING OUT DIRECT BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, CHISSANO SAID IF THE USG CARED TO HELP IN ANOTHER DIRECT MANNER THIS MIGHT ALSO BE ACCEPTED. CHARGE SAID HE WAS NOT INSTRUCTED TO TALK ABOUT AID BUT WOULD RELAY FOREIGN MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON.

C. CUBAN, SOVIET AND CHINESE INTERVENTION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA: TURNING TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN RHODESIA, CHISSANO SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF COMMENTARY IN THE WESTERN PRESS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE INTERVENTION OF CUBAN, CHINESE AND SOVIET ELEMENTS IN THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE NO FOREIGN TROOPS FIGHTING IN RHODESIA, AND HE EXPECTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NONE IN THE FUTURE. "MOZAMBIQUE DOES NOT WANT ANOTHER ANGOLA IN AFRICA." THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOLVED BY THE RHODESIANS THEMSELVES. HE REITERATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INTERVENTION IF ALL STATES RECOGNIZE THAT THE JZIMBABWEAN STRUGGLE IS A JUST ONE," AND IF "SOME STATES" (UNNAMED) DO NOT ATTEMPT TO PROP THE SMITH REGIME UP. HE THEN INFORMED METHAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR (SEE REFTEL) AND INFORMED HIM THAT IT WOULD BE A DANGEROUS MISTAKE FOR HMG TO "TRY AND SAVE SMITH" FROM HIS FATE. HE INFERRED, BUT DID NOT SAY, THAT A FALSE OR PRECIPITOUS MOVE BY HMG WOULD LEAD TO GREATER PROBLEMS IN THE AREA.

D. BYRD AMENDMENT AND RHODESIAN CHROME: CHISSANO MENTIONED THAT US IS ONLY MAJOR COUNTRY NOW OPENLY FLAUNTING UN SANCTIONS AND REMARKED THAT GREAT DEAL OF RHODESIAN CHROME WAS BEING EXPORTED EVEN TODAY, FROM MOZAMBIQUE TO US. HE SAID THAT WHEN CHROME SHIPMENTS FROM MOZAMBIQUE PORTS STOP, THIS WILL CAUSE HARDSHIPS TO MOZAMBIQUE (LOSS OF TRANSPORT REVENUE) AND TO SOME OF ITS PEOPLE (DOCK WORKERS WHO WILL LOSE THEIR JOBS). "IF MOZAMBIQUE CAN MAKE THIS LARGE SACRIFICE, WHY CAN'T THE US MAKE A MUCH SMALLER ONE BY PROHIBITING THE PURCHASE OF THIS CHROME?", HE ASKED. CHARGE INFORMED CHISSANO THAT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF USG HAS GONE ON RECORD AS BEING OPPOSED TO BYRD AMENDMENT, AND THAT CHARGE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEND HIM COPIES OF STATEMENTS MADE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER ON THIS SUBJECT. PROBLEM RESTS WITH THE CONGRESS. CHISSANO SAID HE WOULD WELCOME STATE DEPARTMENT

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EFFORTS TO HAVE BYRD AMENDMENT REPEALED, SO THAT US WOULD BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH SANCTIONS.

3. TURNING AWAY FROM SOUTHERN RHODESIA PROBLEM, CHISSANO PROCEEDED TO INTRODUCE TWO NEW THEMES.

A. DIEGO GARCIA: FOREIGN MINISTER CRITICIZED PRESENCE OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AT DIEGO GARCIA. HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT THE INDIAN OCEAN TO BECOME AN AREA OF CONFLICT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND THAT IT WAS ALSO OPPOSED TO ANY ATTEMPTS BY ALL POWERS, "RUSSIANS INCLUDED" TO ESTABLISH NAVAL FACILITIES IN THE AREA.

B. NAMIBIA: ALTHOUGH MOZAMBIQUE IS A LONG WAY FROM SOUTH WEST AFRICA, HIS GOVERNMENT WAS STILL CONCERNED ABOUT THE STRUGGLE

IN THAT TERRITORY. HE SAID THE USG STILL HAS SOME INFLUENCE IN PRETORIA AND SHOULD USE IT TO PERSUADE PRIMEMINISTER VORSTER TO PULL OUT OF THAT COUNTRY IMMEDIATELY. CONTINUED SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE WILL ONLY LEAD TO TROUBLE. CHARGE TOLD CHISSANO THAT HE HAD SERIOUSLY OVERESTIMATED THE AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE AMERICA HAD IN PRETORIA, THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS REGARD US WITH SUSPICION AND THAT US FULLY SUPPORTS MAJORITY RULE IN NAMIBIA.

4. CHISSANO THEN ASKED WHEN OUR AMBASSADOR WOULD BE ARRIVING, AND CHARGE INFORMED HIM OF DATE. CHISSANO SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DE PREE AND IN CONTINUING US-MOZAMBIQUE DIALOGUE.

5. COMMENT: CHISSANO WHO IS MOST MODERATE AND COMPETENT OF MOZAMBIQUE'S TOP FOUR LEADERS, SEEMED INTENT ON GETTING HIS MESSAGE ACROSS: THAT MOZAMBIQUE SUPPORTS MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA, IS WILLING TO MAKE SACRIFICES TO SEE THAT IT COMES ABOUT, DOES NOT WANT TO SEE ANY OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN RHODESIA AND WANTS US ASSISTANCE VIA THE UN TO ALLEVIATE SOME OF ITS PROBLEMS. IN VIEW OF FACT THAT AMBASSADOR DE PREE IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE HERE MARCH 10 DEPT SHOULD PASS THIS MESSAGE TO HIM IN SWEDEN. IT IS NOT UNLIKELY THAT SOME REPORTERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WILL BE AT THE AIRPORT WHEN HE ARRIVES AND WILL ASK HIM ABOUT US POLICY VIS-A-VIS MOZAMBIQUE (IN VIEW OF SANCTIONS ACTION) AND SOUTHERN RHODESIA.

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6. WHILE CHISSANO TENDED TO DOMINATE CONVERSATION, HE WAS COURTEOUS AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT, EVEN WHILE CRITICIZING US PRESENCE AT DIEGO GARCIA. BRITISH AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSIONS WITH CHISSANO PREVIOUS NIGHT WERE NOT NEARLY AS AMIABLE.
CARSON
UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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